A conversation with my mother
One recurring conversation I have with my mother, as part of my responsibilities as my family's investment manager, concerns large movements in the stock market.
From time to time, I let her know when stock markets move substantially. I also tell her when highly respected investment professionals or widely followed market commentators make high-conviction forecasts that the stock market could experience a substantial decline or even a major crash.
This is a natural conversation to have when you are responsible for managing family capital consisting of over 45 years of accumulated family life savings. If someone credible believes that a major market decline could be approaching, it is reasonable to ask: should we reduce our exposure? Should we sell some stocks? Should we hold more cash? Should we wait for better prices?
My mother has therefore suggested several times over the years that I should sell all the stocks in our portfolio before a projected major crash and then buy everything back near the bottom.
On paper, this sounds simple. In reality, it is one of the hardest things an investor can attempt.
Four decisions, not one
To execute this strategy successfully, an investor needs to make several very difficult decisions correctly.
- You need to know when the market decline will actually begin.
- You need to know when the decline will actually end.
- While the market is falling, you need to know how close you are to the eventual bottom.
- Because we own individual companies rather than simply one market index, you need to know how close each individual stock is to its own eventual bottom.
Then you need to make the decision to buy. That creates another problem. If you wait until the economic outlook becomes clearer, the stock market may already have recovered substantially. If you buy too early, the market may continue falling. If you wait for greater certainty, you may end up buying back at a higher price than where you sold.
This is the fundamental problem with trying to repeatedly time minor and major market crashes. The difficulty is not predicting that markets can fall. Markets have always fallen. Long-run studies of the S&P 500 going back to 1950 put the historical frequency of corrections (declines of 10% or more) at roughly once every two years, and of bear markets (declines of 20% or more) at roughly once every seven years — though these figures vary somewhat depending on the data source and the exact period measured, and the events themselves do not occur on any fixed schedule.
The difficulty is correctly predicting the timing of both the exit and the re-entry. And you have to do it while operating under an environment of high uncertainty.
Predicting a crash is only half of the problem
There is a major difference between saying:
“I think the market is likely to fall substantially.”
and saying:
“I know exactly when to sell, I know exactly when to buy back, and I know that the prices I will get when I buy back will be sufficiently lower to compensate me for the risks and costs of being out of the market.”
The first statement is a stock market forecast. The second is a trading strategy. The second requires much more information.
“I think the market is likely to fall substantially.”
“I know exactly when to sell and buy back, at prices that compensate me for being out of the market.”
Imagine that an investor correctly predicts that a 30% market decline is coming. That sounds impressive. But when should the investor sell? If the investor sells six months before the decline, the market could rise another 15% before falling. The investor has avoided part of the eventual decline but has also missed the preceding gains. If the investor sells after the market has already fallen 10%, the investor has avoided only part of the remaining decline.
Now suppose the investor gets the first decision right. The market falls. The investor is sitting in cash. The next question becomes much harder. When should the investor buy? At a 15% decline? At 20%? At 25%? At 30%? What if the market falls 25% and then suddenly rises 12% in a few weeks? What if it falls another 10% afterward? What if the market never reaches the price level the investor was waiting for?
This is why the phrase “buy near the bottom” hides an enormous amount of complexity.
The bottom is obvious only after it has happened. While you are living through the decline, every potential bottom could simply be another temporary pause before another leg down.
The 2025 tariff shock provides a useful example
The market decline following the United States' “Liberation Day” tariff announcements in April 2025 provides a particularly useful illustration. New, sweeping tariffs announced on 2 April 2025 triggered a sharp, rapid sell-off in global equity markets. At its intraday low on 7 April 2025, the S&P 500 briefly traded more than 20% below its February 2025 peak — the conventional threshold for a bear market — but it did not close at that level, finishing the session just shy of the 20% mark. The index then recovered quickly once a 90-day pause on the reciprocal tariffs was announced, and went on to post a strong year overall, with 2025 commentary widely describing US equities as having been buffeted by tariff, geopolitical and inflation-related uncertainty before staging a substantial recovery.
For a long-term value investor, this created an important distinction. You did not need to predict the exact bottom in advance to benefit from the sell-off. You needed to recognise when stock prices had become sufficiently attractive relative to your estimates of intrinsic value in the stock market crash and start buying decisively.
That is a completely different activity from saying:
“I knew the crash would happen, sold everything beforehand, and bought everything back at the bottom.”
The former is valuation. The latter is market timing.
I took aggressive advantage of the 2025 stock market sell-off as a value investor, as I documented in my 2025 LinkedIn posts. That experience reinforced an important lesson for me. There is a huge difference between being prepared for a market decline and successfully predicting one. Preparation is within an investor's control. Prediction is much less so.
Even great investors face this problem
I have repeatedly reminded my mother that even very highly intelligent and extremely successful long-only investors such as Li Lu, Joel Greenblatt, David Einhorn, Chuck Akre, and Seth Klarman, among others, cannot reliably execute this strategy repeatedly.
And the thing is that these are investors with decades of practical investing experience. They have spent their professional lives studying businesses, financial markets, accounting, valuation, and capital allocation. They have access to research resources that an individual investor cannot realistically reproduce. They have worked with sophisticated investment teams. They have experienced multiple market cycles.
Yet none of that gives an investor a reliable crystal ball.
This is important because investing often creates an illusion of control. A successful investor makes a good call. The market falls. The investor looks intelligent. Another successful call follows. The investor begins to believe that perhaps the next market move can also be predicted. This is where overconfidence can begin.
A few successful financial market forecasts can create the impression that the investor possesses a repeatable forecasting ability when the actual evidence may simply reflect a combination of skill, experience, luck and favourable circumstances.
The same problem applies to me. If investors with vastly greater resources and experience cannot reliably predict the beginning and end of every major market decline, I certainly cannot claim that I can.
I am an investor of modest background and pedigree in Singapore, as I was not educated at Singapore's elite schools such as Victoria Junior College, Raffles Institution, or Hwa Chong Institution, among others. I do not have a large institutional research department behind me, a team of analysts monitoring every company in the portfolio and all major macroeconomic variables around the clock.
I therefore have no rational basis for believing that I possess some extraordinary ability to repeatedly identify the exact beginning and end of major market declines. But I also do not think I need such an ability. That is the more important point.
Investing does not require a crystal ball
The investment process I believe in is based on something much more durable. I own great businesses and spend time to understand their economics. I study how they turn inputs into products and services, products and services into revenue, and revenue into free cash flow. I examine their margins, returns on invested capital, balance sheets, competitive position, and capital allocation. I think about the durability of their advantages. I estimate a reasonable range for their future earnings and cash flows. Then I compare that weighted average output of a realistic range of estimates with the price the stock market is asking me to pay.
This process does not eliminate uncertainty. Nothing does. But it changes the question.
Instead of “Where will the market be six months from now?” — I can ask “What is this business likely to earn over the next five to ten years?”
Instead of “Will the S&P 500 fall another 15%?” — I can ask “Has my estimate of this company's intrinsic value changed?”
Instead of “When will the market bottom?” — I can ask “At today's price, am I being adequately compensated for the risks I am taking?”
These are questions I have a reasonable chance of answering. They are difficult questions, but they are within the scope of fundamental analysis.
Price and value are different things
This distinction is at the heart of value investing. A stock price is a quoted market price. A business has an underlying economic value. The two can move together over long periods, but they can diverge substantially over shorter periods. That divergence is what creates opportunities for long-term investors implementing fundamental analysis, which is the study of individual businesses and the industries they are operating within.
When markets become fearful, prices can fall much faster than the underlying earning power of a strong business. When markets become euphoric, prices can rise much faster than the underlying economics of a business. The investor's job is therefore not to predict where prices are going. The job is to understand whether the current price makes sense relative to the economic value of the underlying business.
This is also why a falling stock price does not automatically mean that the stock has become more attractive. A stock that falls 40% may be cheaper. It may also deserve to be cheaper. If earnings guidance by management and, therefore, expectations from analysts and investors have fallen by more than 50%, the balance sheet has deteriorated, competition has intensified, or the company's competitive advantage has weakened, the lower share price may simply reflect lower intrinsic value.
Conversely, a high-quality business can fall sharply even though its long-term economics remain largely intact. That can create an opportunity. The investor needs to distinguish between the two. This is where accounting analysis, business analysis, and valuation become more important than simply watching the stock chart.