Introduction: the side of investing that receives too little attention
Most investors spend a great deal of time searching for their next great investment.
They look for companies with strong growth, expanding profit margins, large markets, capable management teams, and products that could change entire industries. They study financial statements, estimate future cash flows, compare valuations, and search for opportunities that the market may have overlooked.
These activities matter. With the practice of finding exceptional and great businesses at sensible prices, an investor has a strong chance of producing strong long-term returns.
Yet another question deserves equal attention.
How much capital should we allocate to the investments that we are least certain about?
This question is much less exciting than finding a company that could become ten times more valuable. It rarely gets the same attention as finding a deeply undervalued business or buying a great company during a strong market decline. However, the answer can have a lasting effect on an investment portfolio's long-term growth.
An investor can identify several seemingly excellent companies and still produce poor results by allocating too much money to a weak investment idea. Another investor may achieve a similar level of stock-picking skill but produce better results by keeping uncertain investments small, refusing to average down without good reason, and cutting exposure when the facts no longer support the original decision.
The difference lies in how capital is allocated.
John Maynard Keynes, the British economist who managed investments for King's College, Cambridge, offers a useful historical case study. His experience shows how an investor's methods can change over time, and how the discipline of selecting investments, sizing positions, and managing risk can influence long-term results.
The lesson deserves attention from new investors, experienced stock pickers, and anyone responsible for managing family wealth.
Investment success depends on what we buy. It also depends on what we avoid, how much we risk when we are uncertain, and whether we preserve enough capital to benefit from future opportunities.
1. Keynes: an economist who had to learn how to invest
John Maynard Keynes is best known for his contributions to economics. However, his record as an investment manager provides another important part of his story.
Keynes became involved in managing the endowment of King's College, Cambridge, after the First World War. Over the following decades, he helped change how the college invested its wealth, moving beyond a traditional reliance on land and fixed-income holdings and making substantial use of equities.
His approach did not remain the same throughout his career.
Research by David Chambers, Elroy Dimson and Justin Foo, published as “Keynes the Stock Market Investor: A Quantitative Analysis” in the Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis in 2015 (building on an earlier working paper the same authors circulated through the National Bureau of Economic Research), examines Keynes's historical trading records and investment performance. Their findings describe a manager whose early top-down approach — essentially trying to time currencies, commodities and the broader market — produced disappointing results with no clear evidence of market-timing skill, followed by a shift towards selecting individual companies from the early 1930s onwards.
Keynes gradually placed greater emphasis on business value, individual security selection and longer holding periods. His later approach had more in common with what modern investors recognise as fundamental, value-oriented investing.
The historical record is important because it challenges a common belief: that an intelligent person should be able to identify the correct investment strategy from the beginning.
Keynes was a highly capable economist, but his early investment decisions were not consistently successful. His economic knowledge did not automatically give him a reliable ability to forecast financial markets.
That distinction matters.
Understanding an economy is different from predicting how investors will respond to it. Knowing that a currency, commodity, or stock appears cheap does not guarantee that its price will rise within a useful period. Even a sound economic view can lead to a poor investment when the timing, price paid, or size of the position is wrong.
Investment skill requires more than intelligence. It requires a method that connects business analysis, valuation, risk, and capital allocation.
Keynes's experience also demonstrates the value of learning from failure. A weak early record need not define an investor permanently, provided that the investor identifies the source of the mistakes and changes the process accordingly.
The objective is not to avoid every mistake. No investor can do that consistently. The objective is to become better at recognising mistakes, limiting their consequences, and avoiding repeated errors.
2. The historical record: strong long-term results despite imperfect years
A particularly useful feature of Keynes's record is that he did not outperform the market every year.
The exact figures depend on the period and benchmark used, and on which of the authors' papers is consulted. One estimate, for the roughly quarter-century running up to 1946, is that Keynes's discretionary portfolio for King's College — the Chest Fund — generated an average annual return of approximately 16.0%, compared with approximately 10.4% for a broad UK equity market index over the same stretch.
The central point is clear: Keynes's long-term investment record was strong, even though his path included disappointing decisions and periods of underperformance.
This should change how investors judge their own results.
A three-month period, one calendar year, or even several years may reveal something about an investment process, but it may not tell the whole story. Business performance, valuation changes, interest rates, investor sentiment, and unexpected events can all affect short-term returns.
A sound investment may decline because the market has become fearful. A poor investment may rise because investors have become overly optimistic. In the short run, price movements do not always reflect changes in business value.
However, patience should never become an excuse for refusing to learn.
An investor who underperforms must ask why. Was the original business analysis wrong? Was the valuation too high? Was the position too large? Did the investment thesis change? Did the market simply move against a sound decision, or did new evidence reveal that the original reasoning was weak?
These questions matter more than the simple fact of underperformance.
The useful lesson from Keynes is that investment ability can improve through experience and changes in method. Long-term success requires the capacity to distinguish between a temporary setback and a genuine mistake.
Patience without analysis becomes stubbornness. Analysis without patience can become constant trading. Good investment judgment requires both.
3. The overlooked source of investment returns: keeping weak positions small
A discussion of concentrated investing usually focuses on the largest holdings.
Investors want to know which companies deserve the greatest allocation, which businesses have the strongest competitive advantages, and which opportunities offer the highest expected returns.
These are valid questions, but they cover only one side of portfolio construction.
The other side concerns the weakest positions.
An interesting observation about Keynes is that part of his contribution to the Chest Fund's performance may have depended on keeping his least attractive positions underweight, rather than simply making his strongest ideas much larger. The topic is discussed on the We Study Billionaires podcast episode “Keynes And The Markets” (TIP794), which reports that Keynes's smallest, weakest holdings never made up a large share of the overall Chest Fund.
Nevertheless, the underlying question is valuable, whatever the precise figures involved.
Why should an investor allocate a large amount of capital to an investment when the expected return is uncertain, the downside is substantial, and other opportunities offer a better balance between potential return and risk?
A portfolio is a collection of capital-allocation decisions. Each holding uses money that could have been placed elsewhere or kept in reserve. A weak investment can damage returns in two ways: it can lose money directly, and it can prevent capital from being used more productively.
Consider a simple example.
An investor has a portfolio worth $100,000. Two possible investments are being considered.
Company A is a strong business with a reasonable valuation, sound finances, and a clear path to consistent future cash generation. Company B has very attractive potential but faces much greater uncertainty about its competitive position, balance sheet, and future profits.
Suppose the investor estimates that Company A offers a reasonable prospect of a 15% return over the chosen period, while Company B has a wide range of possible outcomes, including a substantial loss.
The investor does not need to reject Company B completely. However, there is little reason to give both companies equal weight merely because both appear attractive.
A larger position in Company A and a smaller position in Company B may produce a better balance between expected return and the risk of being wrong.
The important point is that position size should reflect the quality of the opportunity, the uncertainty surrounding the analysis, and the damage that a mistake could cause to the overall portfolio.
The investor's job is not to make every idea important. It is to make the best use of limited capital.
4. Why position sizing can matter more than being right
Stock selection and position sizing are closely linked, but they are different skills.
Stock selection asks which investments are attractive. Position sizing asks how much money should be committed to each one.
An investor can select a good company and still make a poor decision by paying too much or allocating too much capital to it. Likewise, a modest position in a very promising but uncertain business may offer useful upside without putting the portfolio at excessive risk.
Consider two hypothetical investors, each with $100,000.
Investor A allocates $20,000 to a company that subsequently falls by 50%. Investor B allocates $5,000 to the same company, which falls by the same 50%. The business performs identically in both cases. The difference in the financial outcome comes entirely from position size.
Same business, same 50% decline, different position size
Investor A must now recover a 10% portfolio loss just to return to the starting value, assuming no other gains or losses. Investor B has suffered a smaller setback and retains more capital for other opportunities.
The mathematics of losses makes this important.
The recovery math of a loss
Recovery gain required = loss % ÷ (1 − loss %). The deeper the loss, the harder the recovery.
This does not mean that investors should avoid every company with meaningful downside. Equity investing always involves high uncertainty, and the most attractive opportunities can sometimes involve very substantial volatility.
It means that the amount at risk deserves careful attention.
A portfolio manager who is excellent at finding opportunities but careless about position size can destroy much of the benefit of good analysis. Another manager who has similar analytical ability but applies sound sizing rules may achieve better results because fewer mistakes become portfolio-threatening events.
For an individual investor, this is an important source of control. Nobody can determine future stock prices with certainty, but investors can choose how much capital they expose to a particular idea.
Being right about a business is only half the job. Sizing the position correctly is the other half.
Part Two turns to the four decisions that follow once a stock is owned (add, hold, trim or sell), why investors struggle to reduce weak holdings, and the difference between business quality and investment quality.