The danger of confusing volatility with risk

One of the most important lessons I have learned as a long-term investor is that price volatility and risk are different concepts. A share price can fall 40% without the underlying business becoming 40% worse. Equally, a share price can rise 50% without the underlying business becoming 50% more valuable.

The stock market gives us a constantly changing price. The business changes at a different, much slower pace. That gap is where psychology comes in.

Investors often become more confident in a business after its share price has risen strongly and less confident after its share price has fallen sharply. That reverses the relationship we should often be examining. If the business remains strong and the valuation becomes substantially more attractive after a steep decline, falling prices can improve the expected return substantially.

This is one reason I prefer to focus on the company's earnings and economics rather than the stock price itself. The stock price tells me what the market is currently offering. The business tells me what I am actually buying.

The behavioural trap of selling before a crash

According to Ben Carlson, CFA, writing on A Wealth of Common Sense, the S&P 500 has, on average since 1950, experienced a correction once every 2 years (declines of 10% or more), a bear market once every 7 years (declines of 20% or more), and a crash once every 12 years (declines of 30% or more).

So it becomes tempting for investors to start to believe that they can sell before the all-time high of the stock market and buy back at the bottom of a correction, bear market, or stock market crash.

The strategy of selling everything before a crash also creates a powerful behavioural problem. Imagine an investor sells a portfolio fully because a respected stock market expert predicts a major decline. The market then falls, and the investor feels vindicated. This is dangerous because being right once can strengthen confidence in the strategy.

The stock market investor then waits for the market to fall further. But stock markets do not move in a neat straight line and begin recovering. The investor thinks: “This recovery is temporary. The real bottom has not arrived yet.” The market rises further. The investor becomes increasingly uncomfortable buying back because prices no longer look as cheap as they did during the panic. Eventually, the investor buys back — perhaps at a price higher than where the portfolio was sold.

The investor may therefore have correctly predicted the crash and still made a poor investment decision.

Being directionally correct does not guarantee that the trade will be profitable.

You can correctly predict that an asset will fall and still lose money. You can correctly predict that an asset will rise and still make a poor return. The price at which you enter and exit matters. The timing and the size of the position matter. And the opportunity cost of sitting in cash matters.

Transaction costs are only the beginning

There is also a mechanical cost to unnecessary trading. Every time an investor moves in and out of positions, there can be commissions, bid-ask spreads, exchange fees, taxes, and other transaction costs depending on the market and account structure.

But these visible costs can be much smaller than the invisible cost of making the wrong decision. The highest cost can be opportunity cost.

Investor sells an exceptional compounder at $100 because a crash is expected
The stock falls to $80 — the investor feels successful
The market begins recovering; the stock reaches $95 — the investor waits, hoping for the $60 price originally anticipated
The stock reaches $110 — the investor still waits
The investor eventually buys back at $120

The investor correctly predicted a major decline. The investor still lost money relative to simply holding the business.

This is why a market-timing strategy must be judged as a complete process. You cannot evaluate the sell decision in isolation. You have to evaluate the entire round trip: sell, wait, re-enter. Then compare the final outcome with what would have happened if you had simply held the investment.

My 2025 experience changed how I think about crashes

The 2025 market sell-off was particularly useful for me because I did not need to know the exact bottom to act aggressively. This is a subtle but important distinction. There is a tendency to think that successful value investing requires buying exactly at the lowest price. It does not.

Intrinsic value of a business is reasonably estimated at $110
The stock falls from $140 to $80, then further to $70
One year later, the stock rebounds to $100

An investor who buys at $80 may never have bought at the lowest price. That does not make the investment unsuccessful. If the investor's valuation work was sound, $80 could already have offered an attractive expected return.

Trying to improve the purchase price from $80 to $70 might sound sensible. But the investor has to consider the probability of getting and catching the opportunity. If the stock rebounds instead, the investor may never get the $70 price. This is where the concept of opportunity cost becomes important.

Sometimes the best investment decision is not the one that produces the lowest possible purchase price. It is the one that offers the best risk-adjusted expected return from the information available at the time.

You do not need to buy at the very bottom

This is one of the most useful lessons I have learned from studying value investing. The objective is not to buy at the very bottom repeatedly and successfully. The objective is to buy at a price that gives you a substantial, attractive margin of safety relative to your estimate of intrinsic value for the stock. Those are very different objectives.

If you buy at the exact bottom, you have demonstrated excellent timing.

If you buy 10% above the bottom and the business subsequently compounds intrinsic value for many years, you can still achieve an excellent investment outcome.

If you buy at the exact bottom of a mediocre business, you can still have a mediocre investment.

This is where value investing becomes important

My investment philosophy has increasingly centred on the idea that exceptional and great businesses can protect long-term capital better than portfolios built primarily around (a) a very large discount to intrinsic value and (b) short- or medium-term price forecasts.

A great business can experience a temporary sharp decline in its share price while continuing to increase its intrinsic value in the meantime. That creates an unusual situation. The market can become more pessimistic about the stock while the business becomes more valuable. This is precisely the kind of situation that a long-term fundamental investor wants to be prepared for.

The opposite situation is equally important. A company can have a rising share price while its underlying business economics remain stagnant or even deteriorate, as could be seen in the meme-stock frenzy of the early 2020s. That can create a dangerous disconnect between price and value.

This is why considerable importance must be placed on business economics, financial quality, and valuation. A high-quality income statement, a strong balance sheet, high returns on invested capital, and strong free cash flow are useful. But none of these should be examined in isolation. The real question is how these pieces fit together.

Does the company have attractive economics? Can those economics persist?

Can the company reinvest capital at high returns? Can management allocate excess cash intelligently?

Can the balance sheet withstand stress? Can accounting numbers be reconciled with economic reality?

Can the company continue producing cash rather than merely accounting earnings?

These questions are far more useful to me than trying to guess whether the S&P 500 will be 10% higher or lower six months from now.

A stock market crash creates a wonderful opportunity

A stock market crash can create some of the best opportunities available to a long-term investor. When fear becomes extreme, correlations can rise sharply. Investors sell what they can. Good, exceptional, and great companies can become temporarily mispriced alongside weak companies. The market does not always distinguish between excellent and mediocre businesses during periods of panic. That can create wonderful opportunities for investors who have already done the work.

This is where preparation matters. If I have studied a company before the crash, I know roughly what I think the business is worth. If I understand its balance sheet, I can assess whether it can survive the downturn. If I understand its competitive position, I can judge whether the crisis has damaged the long-term thesis. If I understand its cash flows, I can assess whether the lower price represents a genuine improvement in expected returns.

The work done before the crash becomes extremely valuable during the crash. This is why I would rather spend my time preparing for volatility than trying to predict its exact arrival.

Volatility vs. risk Behavioural investing Margin of safety Opportunity cost Market crashes